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Interjurisdictional Immunity:
The Pendulum Has Swung
John G. Furey

I. INTRODUCTION
In the division of powers analysis, interjurisdictional immunity has
traditionally been treated as the second of three potential questions. The
first is whether impugned legislation aims at a subject matter outside the
jurisdiction of the legislative body enacting it. This question is answered
through the use of the pith and substance doctrine.
The second question is whether the law, having been found to be
constitutionally valid, is inapplicable to particular persons, places or
things by virtue of those subjects being within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the other level of government. This is the issue that is commonly
referred to as interjurisdictional immunity. Practically speaking, this
question has been restricted to asking whether a provincial law is
applicable to federal persons or things.
The third question asks whether a provincial law, found to be both
valid and applicable, is inconsistent with valid federal law and therefore
inoperative under the doctrine of paramountcy.
Professor Hogg characterizes these three questions, or forms of
attack on the legislation, as questions of legislative validity, applicability
and operability.1
In May 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada rendered two decisions
dealing with the second and third questions. In Canadian Western Bank
v. Alberta,2 the Court considered whether provisions of the insurance
regulatory regime of Alberta which governed the promotion of
insurance, were applicable to federally chartered banks engaging in the
promotion of certain types of insurance authorized under the Bank Act.
The Court also considered whether the legislation was inoperative as

Senior Solicitor with the New Brunswick Power Group of Companies, where he practises in
the areas of Utilities Regulation, Aboriginal Law and Commercial Litigation.
1
Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), at 15-28.
2
[2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”].
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being inconsistent with the Bank Act. In British Columbia (Attorney
General) v. Lafarge,3 the Court considered the applicability of a
municipal zoning and development by-law to the construction of a
concrete batching facility on waterfront lands owned by the Vancouver
Port Authority (a federal undertaking under the Canada Marine Act)4
and leased to Lafarge Canada. In that case, the Court also considered
whether the provisions of the municipal by-law, as delegated provincial
legislation, were inconsistent with the provisions of the Canada Marine
Act.
In Canadian Western Bank, by a 6-1 majority, the Court upheld the
Alberta regulatory regime as being applicable to banks, thereby rejecting
the interjurisdictional immunity argument raised by the banks, and held
that there was no inconsistency between the provincial and federal
legislation, such that the paramountcy doctrine did not render the
provincial legislation inoperative. In Lafarge, again by a 6-1 majority,
the Court rejected the interjurisdictional immunity argument, but
unanimously found operational conflict between the municipal by-law in
question, and the federal regulatory regime surrounding port lands and
lands owned by the Port Authority. Accordingly, the Court held the
municipal by-law to be inoperative. On the issue of interjurisdictional
immunity, Bastarache J. dissented in both cases (concurring in the result
in Lafarge).
This paper focuses solely on the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, as these two cases have significantly altered the application of
that doctrine in favour of allowing valid provincial legislation to apply to
federal undertakings, persons, places or things. I will argue that these
cases have brought much needed clarity to the methodology of
application of the doctrine, though there remains some uncertainty as to
how far the Court has gone in limiting its use.
For a full understanding of the importance of these decisions, it is
necessary to briefly consider the history of the doctrine, and the
significant criticisms levelled at its application.

3
4

[2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lafarge”].
S.C. 1998, c. 10.
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II. THE HISTORY OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY
1. The Companies Cases
The earliest emergence of the concept that valid provincial legislation
could not apply to a federal “thing” arose at the turn of the 19th century,
but the articulation of a requirement of impairment fell to the companies
cases (John Deere Plow Co. v. Wharton and Great West Saddlery Co. v.
The King).5 These cases decided that provincial companies legislation
which prohibited “extra-provincial companies” from carrying on
business in the province without a licence could apply to companies
incorporated under the jurisdiction of other provinces or countries, but
could not apply to a federally incorporated company. The rationale
behind the decisions was that the effect of the prohibition would be to
deprive the federal company of its corporate status or essential power.
Since these were powers within the exclusive authority of the federal
level of government by virtue of its “incorporation power” (recognized
under peace, order and good government), no provincial legislation
could apply to deprive such a company of status.
However, even these early cases distinguished between provincial
legislation which could deprive a federal company of its corporate status
or existence in a province, and provincial legislation which merely
regulated business activity. The latter was held to be applicable to
federal companies.
This has been confirmed more recently in Canadian Indemnity
Company v. British Columbia (Attorney General),6 in which the Supreme
Court found that the creation of a Crown monopoly over automobile
insurance in the province of British Columbia did not impair the
corporate status of federally incorporated insurance companies, but was
merely an example of regulation of a particular business or industry, and
therefore applicable to the federal companies.
2. The Undertakings Cases
The standard of impairment was later expanded and applied to
federal undertakings; in these early cases provincial law was found to be
inapplicable to federal undertakings only if it “impaired” those
5
6

[1914] J.C.J. No. 2, [1915] A.C. 330 (P.C.); [1921] J.C.J. No. 1, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 (P.C.).
[1977] S.C.J. No. 83, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.).
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undertakings in the sense of “paralyzing” or “sterilizing” the undertakings
(Ontario (Attorney General) v. Winner).7
In Quebec (Commission de salaire minimum) v. Bell Telephone Co.,8
the Supreme Court considered whether the Minimum Wage Act of
Quebec9 could apply to employees of Bell Telephone, a federal
undertaking. The Court considered wage rates, like hours of work and
other working conditions, to be a “vital part” of the management and
operation of a federal undertaking, and held the legislation inapplicable,
because “all matters which are a vital part of the operation of an
interprovincial undertaking as a going concern are matters which are
subject to the exclusive legislative control of the federal Parliament”.10
By virtue of Bell Canada 1966, provincial law was now inapplicable to
“vital parts” of federal undertakings, without any requirement of
“impairing”, “paralyzing” or “sterilizing” the undertaking.
This application of the doctrine was the subject of academic
criticism, primarily by Professors Gibson and Hogg.11 These criticisms
were addressed and rejected by the Supreme Court in Bell Canada v.
Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail).12
Bell Canada 1988 became the leading contemporary case on the
scope of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. The Court reasoned
that Parliament was vested with exclusive legislative jurisdiction (on the
facts of that case) over labour relations and working conditions “when
that jurisdiction is an integral part of its primary and exclusive
jurisdiction over another class of subjects”,13 which in that case was the
federal undertaking of telecommunications.
The Court went on to state that this rule:
… appear[ed] to constitute only one facet of a more general rule:
works, such as federal railways, things, such as land reserved for the
Indians, and persons, such as Indians, who were within the special and
exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament, are still subject to provincial
statutes that are general in their application, whether municipal
7

[1954] J.C.J. No. 1, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 657 (P.C.).
[1966] S.C.J. No. 51, [1966] S.C.R. 767 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell Canada 1966”].
9
R.S.Q. 1941, c. 164.
10
Bell Canada 1966, supra, note 8, at 772.
11
Dale Gibson, “Interjurisdictional Immunity in Canadian Federalism” (1969) 47 Can. Bar
Rev. 40; Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), at 329-32.
12
[1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749, at paras. 248-271 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bell
Canada 1988”].
13
Id., at para. 19.
8
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legislation, legislation on adoption, hunting or the distribution of
family property, provided however that the application of these
provincial laws does not bear upon those subjects in what makes them
specifically a federal jurisdiction …14

After addressing and rejecting the academic criticisms of Professors
Gibson and Hogg, the Court reaffirmed the “vital aspect test”, stating
that the principle of interjurisdictional immunity would be “given effect”
if “the provincial statute which purports to apply to the federal
undertaking affects a vital or essential part of that undertaking, without
necessarily going so far as impairing or paralyzing it”.15
In this theory of interjurisdictional immunity, the existence of an
“integral” part of the primary and exclusive federal jurisdiction is based
on the assertion that, due to this exclusivity, there exists a “basic,
minimum and unassailable content”16 to each federal head of power into
which otherwise valid provincial legislation may not intrude.
I would argue that at this stage in the development of the
interjurisdictional immunity jurisprudence, the Court had identified two
related but different concepts. The first is the concept that valid provincial
legislation may not deal with a subject matter which is integral to a
particular head of federal legislative power. The second, related concept
is that provincial legislation may not affect a vital or essential part of a
federally regulated undertaking, person or thing. The first concept is the
constitutional principle of interjurisdictional immunity, and the second is
merely the test applied by the Court in particular circumstances to
determine if that constitutional rule has been violated.
For example, in Bell Canada 1988, the Court confirmed that a
provincial statute will bear upon the specifically federal nature of a
federal undertaking if it affects a vital or essential part of that
undertaking. The very clear wording used by the Court indicated that the
vital aspect test was not a question of whether provincial legislation
merely “affects” the head of federal power (a formulation that would be
quite broad, and threatening to the concepts of “incidental effects” and
“double aspect” under the pith and substance analysis). Rather, the
appropriate question is whether the provincial legislation affects a vital
or essential aspect of the undertaking, person or thing which is subject to
that federal legislative power.
14
15
16

Id., at para. 20 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 312 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 250.
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Further support for this articulation of the doctrine and the vital
aspect test is found in the Supreme Court decision in Irwin Toy17 when
the Court stated:
The federal government has exclusive jurisdiction as regards “essential
and vital elements” of a federal undertaking, including the management
of such an undertaking, because those matters form the “basic,
minimum and unassailable content” of the head of power created by
operation of ss. 91(29) and the exceptions in ss. 92(10) of the
Constitution Act, 1867.18

With respect to Irwin Toy, it is worth noting that, despite the
Court’s rejection of the academic criticisms in Bell Canada 1988 just
one year earlier, the Court began a “reassessment” of the doctrine
of interjurisdictional immunity. This “reassessment” consisted of a
qualification, such that the vital aspect test would apply only to provincial
laws that purported to apply directly to federal undertakings. Where the
provincial law was otherwise aimed, and had only an indirect effect on
the undertaking, the law would be inapplicable only if it impaired,
paralyzed or sterilized the undertaking.

III. CRITICISMS OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY
The criticisms of the doctrine have been varied. After the decision in
Bell Canada 1988, the criticisms no longer called for a rejection of the
doctrine itself, but rather for a rejection of the vital aspect test, and a
return to the impairment standard. A useful summation of the criticisms
is found in the reasons of Bastarache J. in Lafarge.19
In the companion cases of Canadian Western Bank20 and Lafarge,
four major criticisms were advanced at the Supreme Court of Canada.
The first is that the doctrine, particularly after the adoption of the vital
aspect test, had become confused and incapable of consistent
application. Second, it was argued that the threshold for invoking the
doctrine was too low (i.e., “affect a vital aspect” or “touching Indianness”)
and that such a low threshold conflicted with principles of federalism
recognized by the Court. Third, the application of the doctrine was onesided. While in theory both federal and provincial powers are reserved
17
18
19
20

Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 955.
Supra, note 3, at paras. 99-100.
Supra, note 2.
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“exclusively” to each level of government, the Court has generally
concerned itself only with identifying the “basic, minimum and
unassailable content” of federal heads of power. Finally, it was
suggested that any form of interjurisdictional immunity, but particularly
a doctrine with such a low threshold, was unnecessary in a federal
system in which paramountcy rested with the federal level of government.
1. A Confusing Doctrine
Professor Hogg has characterized the vital aspect test as both too
broad and too vague.21 I certainly agree that a determination of what
“affects” a vital or essential part of a federal undertaking, person or thing
is a far more difficult proposition than determining what “impairs”,
“sterilizes” or “paralyzes”. However, my criticism of the confusion in
application of the doctrine stems primarily from its overly broad
application, in two ways.
(a) When Should the Doctrine be Applied?
The first is the question of when the doctrine is to be applied. As
already pointed out, in theory there is a “basic, minimum and
unassailable content” or “core” to every head of power, both federal and
provincial. However, when addressing the “core” of the various federal
heads of power, the Supreme Court has not applied the theory
consistently to every federal power. A comparison of two decisions
illustrates this point.
In Ordon Estate v. Grail,22 the Court considered whether provincial
legislation governing damages, negligence and apportionment of liability
could fill in any gaps in Canadian maritime law and govern a fatality
occurring as a result of a boating accident on inland waters of Ontario.
After quoting the seminal passage of Beetz J. from Bell Canada 1988
(which treated the “general rule” as being restricted to works, things and
persons), the Court treated this as a principle “that each head of federal
power possesses an essential core which the provinces are not permitted
to regulate indirectly”.23
21

Supra, note 1.
[1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 (S.C.C.).
23
Id., at para. 83 (emphasis added); Bell Canada 1988, [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 749 (S.C.C.).
22
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The Court went on to hold that maritime negligence law was part of
the unassailable core of the federal power over navigation and shipping
(i.e., federal maritime law) and for that reason, provincial legislation
could not apply even for the purpose of filling in gaps in federal law.
The extension of interjurisdictional immunity from undertakings,
things and persons to a head of federal power which governs an activity
(navigation and shipping) was perceived to be necessary on the facts of
Ordon Estate, in order to preserve a uniform system of maritime
negligence law across the country. This desire for uniformity, and the
Court’s perception that the lack of uniformity would compromise
Canada’s international treaty obligations relating to maritime matters,
was of great concern to the Court.24
This is to be contrasted with the approach taken by the Court in
O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General), in which it was argued that a
provincial law limiting political activities of provincial civil servants
during federal election campaigns intrudes upon a core of exclusive
federal jurisdiction over federal elections. After discussing the history of
interjurisdictional immunity, Dickson C.J.C. stated that in his view, it
was “not a particularly compelling doctrine”, accepted the criticisms as
advanced by Professor Hogg and concluded by stating:
I am not prepared to extend the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
into a field — federal elections — which is unrelated to either the
company law cases or the federal undertakings cases, the two historical
roots of the doctrine.25

Both Ordon Estate and O.P.S.E.U. are cases in which the Court was
asked to protect the core of a federal power governing an activity, as
opposed to federal things or persons. It cannot be seriously argued that
navigation and shipping is any more closely related to the companies and
undertakings cases than is federal elections. Accordingly, it is
exceedingly difficult to reconcile the two cases, other than to say that the
Court felt a need for uniformity in maritime negligence law, and no
similar considerations governed the fact circumstance in O.P.S.E.U. In
any event, the treatment of these two cases highlights the confusion
surrounding the question of when the doctrine would be applied,
particularly outside the context of undertakings, persons or things.

24
25

Id., at para. 88.
[1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at para. 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “O.P.S.E.U.”].
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(b) The Methodology of Application of the Doctrine
A second source of confusion has existed in the methodology of
application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity. I have already
proposed that the correct methodology is to view the constitutional
doctrine as a prohibition on valid provincial legislation dealing with a
subject matter which is integral to, or at the core of, a particular head of
federal legislative power. Since Bell Canada 1988,26 determination of
that question generally has fallen to the application of the vital aspect
test: does the provincial law affect a vital or essential part of the federal
undertaking, person or thing? If it does, it deals with a matter integral to
the federal power.
In such an analysis, the question of whether the provincial
legislation affects a vital part of the federal undertaking, person or thing
is necessarily a fact-based assessment.
Examples of such a fact-based assessment exist throughout the
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Irwin Toy,27 the Court considered
Quebec legislation which prohibited the use of commercial advertising
directed at persons under 13 years of age. The focus of the Court’s
factual inquiry was the effect of that provision on the operations of
television broadcasters (as federal undertakings). In Natural Parents v.
British Columbia (Superintendent of Child Welfare), the Court found
that provincial adoption legislation could not apply of its own force to
Indian children on the basis of the Court’s factual assessment of the
potential that Indian parents could be compelled to surrender Indian
children to adopting non-Indian parents, which would “constitute a
serious intrusion in the Indian family relationship”.28 It was the effect of
the legislation upon the rights of persons under federal jurisdiction
which drove the reasons of the Court.
Similarly, in Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board),29 the
Court considered the objection of the airline to the payment of a mark-up
charge by a provincial liquor corporation respecting liquor destined for
consumption during flight. The Court acknowledged that, while in some
circumstances the provision of food and water on aircraft would be
essential (i.e., on longer flights), the provision of liquor was simply not
essential to the operation of aircrafts. Once again, the Court conducted a
26
27
28
29

Supra, note 23.
Supra, note 17.
[1976] S.C.J. No. 101, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 751, at 760-61 (S.C.C.).
[1997] S.C.J. No. 66, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 581 (S.C.C.).
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fact-specific analysis of the effect of the provincial legislation upon the
federally regulated undertaking, in order to determine if the legislation
impacted upon the basic, minimum and unassailable core of federal
jurisdiction.
However, this methodology of application has not been uniform. A
comparison of the treatment in the lower courts of the companion cases
of Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge illustrates the confusion
surrounding the application of the doctrine.
In Canadian Western Bank, the Alberta Court of Appeal essentially
followed this proposed analysis, without expressly stating so. However,
the Court explicitly recognized the necessary factual inquiry, when it
stated:
What is at the core of a federal power is obviously fact-sensitive, as is
the determination of whether the impugned law affects a vital part of a
matter within exclusive federal jurisdiction. Recent Supreme Court
cases demonstrate this.30

The Alberta Court of Appeal accepted the findings of fact of the trial
judge, leading to the conclusion that the promotion of certain types of
insurance was not at the core of banking. The relevant factual findings
included the voluntary nature of the insurance in question, that it could
be cancelled after a loan had been advanced, and the lack of connection
between the insurance and loan repayment. These factors were cited as
evidence that the promotion of insurance was simply a new source of
profitability for banks, rather than a form of protection of loan portfolios.
Thus, the Alberta courts concluded that, factually, promotion of
insurance could not be at the “core” of banking. It followed that the
impugned regulations did not affect anything at the “core”.
In the companion case of Lafarge, however, the British Columbia
Court of Appeal had applied the doctrine in a much broader fashion.
Rather than asking whether the municipal by-law in question (which
contained height restrictions that would have prohibited the concrete
batch plant proposed by Lafarge) affected a vital or essential part of the
federal undertaking in question (the Port Authority) the Court of Appeal
instead articulated the test as a question of “whether the application of
the city’s by-law to regulate the development of port lands would affect
a vital aspect of the federal power over navigation and shipping”.31
30

[2005] A.J. No. 21, 249 D.L.R. (4th) 523, at para. 44 (Alta. C.A.).
Burrardview Neighborhood Assn. v. Vancouver (City), [2004] B.C.J. No. 355, 237 D.L.R.
(4th) 466, at para. 96 (B.C.C.A.) (emphasis added).
31
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Not surprisingly, the British Columbia Court of Appeal proceeded to
find that the exercise of jurisdiction over land use and development on
lands owned by the Port Authority was a vital part of the federal power,
and that any provincial regulation in that area was therefore inapplicable.
The Court did not factually address the impact of the municipal bylaw under attack on the operations of the Port Authority. In short, the
Court did not address the question of whether the by-law affected a vital
or essential part of the Port Authority’s operations. On the facts of the
case, the lands upon which Lafarge Canada, as lessee, proposed to build
the concrete batch plant were lands that were incidental to the use of the
port, not lands used in port operations. The most that could be said on
the facts of the case is that the operations of Lafarge Canada on these
lands would be supportive of port operations, in the sense that they
created a demand for port business, in the form of shipping of aggregate
and other products.
The framing of the question by the British Columbia Court of
Appeal was, with respect, overly broad. As already stated, such a broad
characterization of the test threatened the existence of the “double aspect”
doctrine, and the concept that valid legislation can have “incident effects”
on the other level of government.
More to the point, however, it was significantly at odds with the
methodology of application utilized by the Alberta Court of Appeal in
Canadian Western Bank.32
2. The Threshold and Principles of Federalism
Following Bell Canada 1988, the threshold for application of the
doctrine was crossed when provincial legislation “affected” a vital or
essential part of a federal undertaking, person or thing. It is apparent that
this is a considerably lower threshold than the previous formulation of
the test, which required impairment, in the sense of “paralyzing” or
“sterilizing” the undertaking. In Bell Canada 1988, Beetz J. contemplated
that the doctrine would be applied to preclude application of provincial
legislation to a federal undertaking if the legislation affected a vital or
essential part of the undertaking, “without necessarily going as far as
impairing or paralyzing”.33

32
33

Supra, note 30.
Bell Canada 1988, supra, note 23, at para. 312.
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This lower threshold, combined with the potential that the doctrine
could be applied to protect a core of every federal head of power, could
represent a significant threat to principles of federalism. What are these
principles? They were enunciated by the Court in O.P.S.E.U., where
Dickson C.J.C. recognized that “the history of Canadian constitutional
law has been to allow for a fair amount of interplay and indeed overlap
between the federal and provincial powers” and that the concept of
interjurisdictional immunity has not been the “dominant tide” of Canadian
constitutional law, those being the doctrines of pith and substance and
“double aspect”.34
More recently, the Court has summarized the relevant principles of
federalism as follows:
In a federal system, each level of government can expect to have its
jurisdiction affected by the other to a certain degree. As Dickson C.J.
stated in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 641, at p. 669, “overlap of legislation is to be expected
and accommodated in a federal state”. Laws mainly in relation to the
jurisdiction of one level of government may overflow into, or have
“incidental effects” upon, the jurisdiction of the other level of government.
It is a matter of balance and of federalism: no one level of government
is isolated from the other, nor can it usurp the functions of the other.35

The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, particularly when
formulated as the vital aspect test, conflicts with these principles of
federalism. Too low a threshold for invocation of the doctrine is
threatening to the fundamental constitutional doctrine that laws of one
level of government may incidentally affect the jurisdiction of the other
level of government.
It is worth noting that in Law Society of British Columbia v.
Mangat,36 the Supreme Court considered whether agents appearing
before the federal Immigration Refugee Board were required to comply
with British Columbia’s Legal Profession Act.37 The Court rejected the
argument that the provincial legislation could not apply because of
interjurisdictional immunity, in fact rejecting the application of the
doctrine to the particular facts of that case. The Court held that the
existence of a “double aspect” to the subject matter at issue favoured
34
35
36
37

O.P.S.E.U., supra, note 25, at 18-19.
Reference re Firearms Act, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783, at para. 26 (S.C.C.).
[2001] S.C.J. No. 66, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 113 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mangat”].
S.B.C. 1987, c. 25.
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the application of the paramountcy doctrine, rather than that of
interjurisdictional immunity. The Court was concerned with the potential
that interjurisdictional immunity would exclude the application of the
provincial legislation even in circumstances where Parliament chose not
to legislate in the area.
3. Unnecessary Where Paramountcy Rests with the Federal
Parliament
Mangat is the appropriate lead-in for the criticism that the doctrine is
unnecessary to protect federal core jurisdiction in light of federal
paramountcy.
In my view, this is one of the more salient criticisms of the vital
aspect test. The vast majority, if not all, of the challenges to provincial
legislation on the basis of interjurisdictional immunity are not challenges
in which the federal level of government seeks to limit the application of
provincial legislation. Rather, these challenges are commenced by
“federal” persons or organizations such as banks, telecommunications
companies, inter-provincial railways, and port authorities who seek to
avoid the impact of valid provincial legislation which governs the
conduct of all other “non-federal” persons and organizations that would
normally be subject to such legislation. If the federal level of government
were truly concerned that provincial legislation was encroaching upon
the core of federal jurisdiction in a particular area, the federal Parliament
need only speak in clear and unambiguous terms to invoke the doctrine
of paramountcy, either by creating an operational conflict between
federal and provincial legislation, or alternatively, drafting legislation
which has a purpose incompatible with the application of provincial
legislation to the federally regulated persons, things or undertakings.
This criticism still relates to reconciliation of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity with the principles of federalism. Because
interjurisdictional immunity is supplemented by the doctrine of federal
paramountcy, it is far more consistent with the principles of federalism
espoused in O.P.S.E.U.38 and the Firearms Reference39 if the threshold
for application of the doctrine is a threshold of impairment, rather than a
threshold of “affecting” a vital aspect.

38
39

Supra, note 25.
Supra, note 35.
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The final point to this criticism is one that had already been made
by the Supreme Court prior to its decisions in Canadian Western Bank40
and Lafarge.41 This is the reality that application of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity can oust provincial law even in circumstances
when Parliament has not legislated in the area.42 This raises the risk of
regulatory vacuums, and uneven regulation of federal and provincial
organizations involved in essentially the same activity. The facts in
Canadian Western Bank are a prime illustration of this potential problem.
Banks, as federally regulated organizations, having been authorized by
the Bank Act43 to enter into a provincially regulated field (insurance),
could potentially avoid the application of provincial law governing all
others who promote insurance in a particular province.
4. One-sided Nature of the Doctrine
As has already been pointed out, the theoretical underpinning for the
doctrine is the exclusive nature of federal jurisdiction over the various
heads of power set out in section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867,44 and
the fact that each such head of power has a “core” which must be
protected from provincial regulation. However, the heads of power
granted to the provinces under section 92 are no less exclusive than
federal powers, subject of course to the doctrine of paramountcy in the
double aspect cases. There is no recognition of this fact in the form of a
basic, minimum and unassailable content attributed to provincial heads
of power.
This is perhaps so because of the existence of the doctrine of
paramountcy. It could be argued that valid federal legislation could
never be held inapplicable to a subject matter which is at the “core” of a
provincial power, if the rules of our Constitution state that paramountcy
is reserved to the federal Parliament in the event of conflict between
valid provincial and valid federal legislation.
However, this does not alter the fact that interjurisdictional
immunity is a one-sided doctrine. An illustrative example is found in
Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada.45 At first blush, this case
40
41
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was a simple exercise in the statutory interpretation of section 10 of the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act,46 which provides that civilian
employees necessary for carrying out the duties of the RCMP are to be
appointed under specific federal legislation. The provision was
interpreted by the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal as requiring
provincial and municipal employees supporting RCMP operations to be
employed by the federal government as civilian employees of the
RCMP. This of course arose in circumstances in which the RCMP was
providing policing services under contract to provinces and municipalities.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court issued a one-paragraph decision in which
it limited the application of section 10 of the RCMP Act to civilian staff
appointed by the RCMP Commissioner, stating that it did not apply to
civilian staff appointed or employed by a municipality where that
municipality has a policing agreement with the RCMP.
However, but for that interpretation, the case would have raised a
significant constitutional issue. Could Parliament require that such
employees be federal employees? Such a question would pit provincial
jurisdiction over the “administration of justice in the Province” against
the federal power to manage its own organizations, in this case the
RCMP. It has long been recognized that the enforcement of criminal
law, policing and the suppression of crime and disorder is part of
provincial jurisdiction over the administration of justice, and is “wholly
with the provinces”.47
Thus, it is clearly within the authority of the provinces to contract
for the provision of policing services from the RCMP, but at the same
time employ matrons, guards, receptionists and janitors as provincial
employees who provide support services necessary for the operation of a
policing detachment. The Attorney General of New Brunswick intervened
in this case, and applied to the Court to state two constitutional questions.
The first constitutional question asked whether section 10 of the RCMP
Act was constitutionally invalid in relation to the administration of justice
under section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This constitutional
question was stated by the Chief Justice for the Court.
The second constitutional question proposed by the Attorney
General of New Brunswick was whether section 10(1) of the RCMP Act
was constitutionally applicable to provincial and municipal civilian
46
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47

612

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d)

employees providing support services to the RCMP, where the RCMP is
performing provincial policing duties under contract with a province or
municipality. This constitutional question, which would have directly
raised whether federal legislation could intrude on the core of provincial
jurisdiction, was not stated for the Court.
One can only conclude that the Court had no desire to embark on an
inquiry of the question of “basic, minimum and unassailable content” of
provincial heads of power.

IV. THE DECISIONS
In Canadian Western Bank, the Court acknowledged virtually all of
the criticisms advanced, and made it clear that the Court did not favour
“an intensive reliance on the doctrine”.48 Six reasons were advanced for
this position, as follows:49
1. Broad application of the doctrine to “activities” creates a problem of
application which does not exist with respect to undertakings, things
or persons.
2. Broad application is inconsistent with principles of federalism,
promoted by the constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, double
aspect and paramountcy.
3. Excessive reliance on the doctrine would create serious uncertainty.
4. The risk of creating “legal vacuums”, recognized in Mangat, is
generally speaking not desirable.
5. Broad use of the doctrine creates an “unintentional centralizing
tendency of constitutional interpretation”. This “asymmetrical”
application of the doctrine is incompatible with contemporary Canadian
federalism.
6. The doctrine is superfluous due to the operation of the doctrine of
federal paramountcy.
Having accepted the criticisms advanced, the Court has taken three
concrete steps that clearly reduce the circumstances in which the
doctrine will be applied. I would also argue that the Court has given
itself room to further restrict the applicability of the doctrine in future
cases. I will first deal with the three limitations the majority has placed
on the applicability of the doctrine.
48
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1. Higher Threshold — A Return to Impairment
The Court spent little time in raising the threshold for the application
of the doctrine from “affecting” a vital or essential part of a federal
undertaking, person or thing to “impairing” that vital or essential part.
“Affecting”, in the opinion of the Court, is not enough to invoke the
doctrine, because it does not imply any requirement of “adverse
consequence”, whereas the concept of impairment does imply such a
consequence to the federal person, thing or undertaking.
Ultimately, the Court concluded:
It is when the adverse impact of a law adopted by one level of
government increases in severity from “affecting” to “impairing”
(without necessarily “sterilizing” or “paralyzing”) that the “core”
competence of the other level of government (where the vital essential
part of an undertaking duly constitutes) is placed in jeopardy, and not
before.50

This statement raises two points. First, despite the earlier statement
of the Court that the law as it stood prior to Bell Canada 198851 better
reflected Canada’s federal scheme, this decision may not represent a
return to the older impairment concept, which was connoted with
“sterilizing” or “paralyzing” the federal undertaking. Rather, the Court
seems to be saying that while impairment is required, in the sense that
there must be an “adverse consequence” upon the federal undertaking as
a result of the provincial law, it is not necessary to “sterilize” or
“paralyze” in order to invoke the doctrine.
In this sense, it may be that the view of the majority on the
appropriate threshold for the application of the doctrine is not
significantly at odds with the standard suggested by Bastarache J. in
dissent in Lafarge. Justice Bastarache argues for a “kind of middle
ground” between the overly vague and broad standards of “touches on”
(a phrase which is usually associated with the Indian cases), and the
overly restrictive standard of “sterilizes” or “impairs”. In the view of
Bastarache J., paralysis of the core of the federal power or the operations
of the undertakings is not required, but “the impact of the application of
the by-law must be sufficiently serious to trigger immunity”.52
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It is arguable that, with respect to the sole issue of the threshold of
application, these two views are not as divergent as they may first
appear. The view of the majority does contemplate a middle ground,
because its view of “impairment” does not consist of a requirement for
“paralyzing” or “sterilizing”. For Bastarache J., the concept of
impairment does imply a requirement of “sterilizing”. For reasons that
shall be seen however, I believe a significant difference does exist
between the threshold established by the majority, and that relied upon
by Bastarache J. in dissent.
The second point concerns the methodology of application of the
doctrine, where the majority and Bastarache J. clearly diverge. In his
dissent in Lafarge, Bastarache J. follows the same approach as that of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal when he characterizes the
question as whether the municipal by-law would affect a vital part of the
federal legislative authority over navigation and shipping. This flows
from his characterization of interjurisdictional immunity as concerning
jurisdiction, rather than action or activities. His analysis is far less
concerned about the impact of provincial law on the federal undertaking,
person or thing, than it is upon the federal head of power.53
The majority, however, does equate the “core” competence of the
federal level of government with the vital or essential part of federally
regulated undertakings, persons or things. This approach is much more
consistent with the methodology I had earlier referred to, and does
engage in the fact-based determination of whether there is an impairment
of a vital or essential part of the federal undertaking, in order to
determine if the provincial law strikes at what is “integral” to the federal
head of power.
As will be seen however, the majority does reserve a slightly
different treatment for the cases involving federal heads of power
dealing with “activities”.
This difference in methodology determines the result in the Lafarge
case. The approach of Bastarache J., which is a considerably broader
application of the doctrine, results in a finding that the municipal by-law
is inapplicable. The approach of the majority led to a decision that
interjurisdictional immunity did not apply.

53

Id., at para. 135.
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2. “Vital and Essential” Means “Vital and Essential”
Though not as dramatic as altering the threshold for application
established in Bell Canada 1988, the reinforcement by the majority that
the provincial legislation must impair a “vital and essential part” of an
undertaking is nonetheless important. The majority treats “vital or
essential” in its ordinary grammatical sense, focusing on the meaning of
“absolutely indispensable or necessary”.54 This clarification, combined
with the methodology of application of the majority and the raising of
the threshold to one of “impairment”, effectively returns the application
of interjurisdictional immunity to a standard of “sterilizing” or
“paralyzing”. If a provincial law must impair that part of an undertaking
which is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to the undertaking
before the law would be considered inapplicable, it is difficult to see
how anything short of “paralyzing” the undertaking would suffice.
The facts in Canadian Western Bank are not particularly helpful in
demonstrating this point, as the Court made it very clear that the
provincial insurance licensing requirements in question did not affect the
“core” of banking, let alone impair it. However, the way in which the
Court phrases its conclusions on the facts of the case supports a return to
the requirement of “sterilizing” or “paralyzing”. The Court states:
It is simply not credible, in our view, to suggest that the promotion of
“peace of mind” insurance is “absolutely indispensable or necessary”
to enable the banks to carry out their undertakings in what makes them
specifically of federal jurisdiction.55

If a particular activity is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to
enable a federal undertaking to carry out its undertaking, provincial law
which prohibits that activity must surely paralyze the undertaking.
3. Paramountcy Is the Preferred Doctrine
In addition to the alterations in the threshold of application for the
doctrine, the majority placed greater restriction on the federal heads of
power to which the doctrine will be applied. The majority does this in
the context of discussion of the appropriate order of application of the
constitutional doctrines of pith and substance, interjurisdictional
immunity and paramountcy.
54
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It is unfortunate that the majority chose to address this issue in the
terms that it did. If interjurisdictional immunity is to be considered, it
would always be considered after pith and substance, and before
paramountcy. This is so simply because a provincial law which does
“impair” a federal undertaking from carrying on its undertaking, would
be inapplicable even in the absence of conflicting federal legislation, and
because paramountcy considerations are moot if interjurisdictional
immunity does apply. The majority clearly recognized this when it stated
“in theory, consideration of interjurisdictional immunity is apt for
consideration after the pith and substance analysis”.56
The issue is not really one of the order of application of the doctrines
of interjurisdictional immunity and paramountcy. The question is
whether interjurisdictional immunity should be applied at all, in
particular cases.
It would have been preferable if the majority had restricted itself to
its statements that:
[interjurisdictional immunity] will be largely reserved for those heads
of power that deal with federal things, persons or undertakings, or
where in the past its application has been considered absolutely
indispensable or necessary to enable Parliament or a provincial
legislature to achieve the purpose for which exclusive legislative
jurisdiction was conferred, as discerned from the constitutional
division of powers as a whole, or what is absolutely indispensable or
necessary to enable an undertaking to carry out its mandate in what
makes it specifically of federal (or provincial) jurisdiction. 57

The Court seems to be motivated by its desire to avoid a
circumstance in which the “core” of every federal head of power would
have to be identified, in order to determine whether or not provincial
regulation has intruded into that core. Accordingly, the Court has
restricted the doctrine to those federal heads of power governing things,
persons or undertakings, and those heads of power which govern
activities but in which the doctrine has already been applied.58
Remember that the first reason the Court expressed for not favouring
“an intensive reliance on the doctrine” was that broad application of the
doctrine to “activities” created problems of application which do not
56
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exist with respect to undertakings, things and persons. Application of the
doctrine to the latter circumstance is conceptually easier, and the test is
much more clearly articulated. It is consistent with the methodology of
the analysis suggested in Bell Canada 198859 and Irwin Toy;60 provincial
legislation strikes at the core of federal powers over undertakings,
persons and things when it impairs the undertaking from carrying on its
undertaking, or the person from engaging in activity which is
specifically federal in nature (for example, in the case of “Indians”, the
exercise of Aboriginal and treaty rights).
The confusion in the analysis and application of interjurisdictional
immunity has, in large part, flowed from the difficulty in applying the
doctrine to federal heads of power governing “activities”. In those cases,
there is not always a federal person, place or undertaking to which the
test, whether it be the vital aspect test or an impairment test, can be
applied. It is in these types of cases in which courts (like the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Lafarge)61 have asked the overly broad
question of whether the provincial legislation affects a vital part of the
federal power itself.
The majority seems content to address this methodology of
application problem by restricting the application of the doctrine to the
undertakings cases, and the “activities” heads of power where the
doctrine has already been recognized in the past.
It would probably be unwise to consider this as an absolute bar
against the extension of the doctrine to other federal heads of power
which govern activities. However, it would likely require quite a
dramatic case of provincial intrusion into a federal area of responsibility
to justify further extension of the doctrine.
4. Potential for Further Restrictions of the Doctrine
In Canadian Western Bank, the majority reaffirmed that the doctrine
of paramountcy “is much better suited to contemporary Canadian
federalism” than is interjurisdictional immunity, referring to the “double
aspect” case of Mangat.62 It is this preference for paramountcy which led
the Court to restrict the application of the doctrine to federal things,
59
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persons or undertakings, and those situations in which the doctrine has
already been recognized in the jurisprudence.
The majority goes no further than that in its reasons in Canadian
Western Bank. However, in Lafarge, the Court appears to build on the
reasons set out in Canadian Western Bank, stating as follows:
For the reasons we gave in Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, 2007
SCC 22, released concurrently, we agree with the approach outlined by
the late Chief Justice Dickson in OPSEU v. Ontario (Attorney
General), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 at p. 18, in which he characterized the
arguments for an interjurisdictional immunity as not particularly
compelling, and concluded that they ran contrary to the “dominant
tide” of Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. In particular, in our
view, the doctrine should not be used where, as here, the legislative
subject matter (waterfront development) presents a double aspect. Both
federal and provincial authorities have a compelling interest. Were
there to be no valid federal land use planning controls applicable to
the site, federalism does not require (nor, in the circumstances, should
it tolerate) a regulatory vacuum, which would be the consequence of
interjurisdictional immunity.63

Later in the Lafarge decision, in discussing the scope of
interjurisdictional immunity, the majority states:
The question before us, therefore, is whether it can be said that
federal jurisdiction over all development on VPA lands within the port
area of Vancouver, even non-Crown lands not used for shipping and
navigation purposes, is “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to the
discharge by the VPA of its responsibilities in relation to federal
“public property” or “shipping and navigation”. We concluded in
Canadian Western Bank that interjurisdictional immunity is not
essential to make these federal powers effective for the purposes for
which they were conferred and therefore this appeal should be decided
on the basis of federal paramountcy, not interjurisdictional immunity. 64

Taken at face value, the statement that the doctrine should not be
used where a case presents a double aspect, has potentially far-reaching
restrictions on application of the doctrine. It raises the further question of
when a case will be considered to be a “double aspect” case.
In Mangat, the Court was considering the constitutional validity of
provisions of the federal Immigration Act, which governed the
63
64
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representation of aliens appearing before the Immigration Appeal Board.
The Court acknowledged the statement of the Privy Council in Hodge v.
The Queen65 where it was said that “subjects which in one aspect and for
one purpose fall into s. 92, may in another aspect and for another
purpose fall into s. 91”. The Court was of the view that the provisions
had both federal and provincial features, the federal being the regulation
of procedures before the Immigration Appeal Board, and the provincial
being the regulation of the legal profession. Because the Court found
each feature of roughly equivalent importance, the provisions were held
to be validly enacted under the “double aspect” doctrine.
Is it not the case, however, that virtually all cases in which
interjurisdictional immunity is raised are “double aspect” cases? After
all, interjurisdictional immunity questions the applicability of otherwise
valid provincial legislation to something which is specifically federal.
By definition, there is a valid provincial aspect; otherwise the provincial
legislation would be ultra vires. Similarly, there is a federal feature by
virtue of the special federal jurisdiction over federal undertakings and
certain other persons or things.
This potential must not be overstated, however. The leading double
aspect cases are cases in which the federal “aspect” was one that fell
within a federal head of power regulating “activities” as opposed to an
undertaking, thing or person. In particular, the leading double aspect
cases considered the federal aspect as one coming within criminal law.66
This is to be contrasted with the treatment of the double aspect
doctrine in the leading undertakings cases, being Bell Canada 196667 and
Bell Canada 1988. The response of the Court in Bell Canada 1988 to the
academic criticisms of Bell Canada 1966, particularly those of Professor
Hogg, is instructive.68 Professor Hogg had criticized Bell Canada 1966
as “coming down on the wrong side of the issue” because employment
was a matter which clearly fell within provincial jurisdiction over
property and civil rights in the province. Since the regulation of
employment in federal industries still remained a matter related to
employment generally, Professor Hogg argued that this was a perfect
situation for the application of the double aspect doctrine.69
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The Court in Bell Canada 1988 expressly rejected this position with
respect to federal undertakings. It would take a further decision of the
Court, expressly overturning this part of Bell Canada 1988, in order to
reconsider application of the double aspect doctrine in the undertakings
cases. The Court clearly did not go this far in the companion cases of
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge.

V. CONCLUSION
In his dissenting reasons in Canadian Western Bank, Bastarache J.
stated that the approach of the majority “severely restricts” the doctrine
of interjurisdictional immunity.70 I agree completely with that
assessment.
Interjurisdictional immunity is now “largely reserved” for application
to federal undertakings, persons and things, and those federal heads of
power regulating “activities” which have already been recognized by
precedent. Furthermore, the threshold for application of the doctrine has
undoubtedly been raised, though how far the bar has risen does remain
open to some question.
To borrow from the analogy of Dickson C.J.C. in O.P.S.E.U.,71 the
“dominant tide” of the doctrines of “double aspect” and “pith and
substance” currently has the upper hand against the “undertow” of
interjurisdictional immunity. In that sense, the pendulum truly has swung.
However, as with all general statements, there are potential
exceptions. In this case the potential exception is the application of the
doctrine to the federal power over “Indians and Lands reserved for the
Indians” under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In a
decision released in December 2006, six months before the decisions in
Canadian Western Bank and Lafarge, the Court considered whether
valid provincial hunting legislation prohibiting hunting at night with the
aid of a light could apply to Aboriginals exercising treaty rights to hunt.72
In a 4-3 decision, the majority affirmed that treaty rights are at the “core”
of the federal power over “Indians”, and held that only if the provincial
law resulted in an “insignificant interference” with the treaty right could
it apply to Aboriginals. Clearly, the threshold applied by the Court was
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different than the new impairment standard set out in Canadian Western
Bank just six months later.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the extent of the
difference, or the rationale, if any, that exists for a different standard in
the context of the federal power over “Indians”. For the purpose of this
paper, suffice it to say that the issues surrounding the standard to be
followed in the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
are not completely resolved.

